PARTIAL INTEGRATION, INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA, AND CRISIS-DRIVEN POLICY MACHINERY
Political and operational confines defining eurozone monetary and fiscal policy settings have taken on increasing importance since spring 2010.
Relative to major policy matters, the pulling of European Union (EU) institutional levers, at least those not pre-authorized by a stretched interpretation of EU treaty manuals, effectively requires unanimous pre-consent of eurozone-17 or EU-27 membership. And many of those consents require approvals of member-parliaments, citizenry, and/or courts. Among the seventeen nations sharing the euro currency, a lack of key federal institutions limits actions that can be taken in important areas. 1 Accordingly, the level of institutional inertia that must be overcome to arrive at material EU policy change is some unknowable multiple of that necessary to make a decision in the most politically dysfunctional of member states. It is a hugely energy-intensive process. 2 Consequently, not a single material eurozone policy action can be taken except following the arrival of a crisis. For initiatives involving treaty consideration, requisite unanimity is attained only with much arm-twisting and only through crisis. 1 Major initiatives which fall outside the confines of institutions and processes established through EU treaties generally require new treaties or amendments to existing treaties, and also generally require unanimous consent of member governments (i.e., rather than resolution through existing legislative machinery of the EU). Initiation of EU legislation resides within the purview of the European Commission (one representative appointed by each member-government, confirmed by EU Parliament), which serves as a quasi-executive body. Parliament (754 seats) constitutes the only EU body subject to direct election, and one of two (with the Council) legislative bodies. The 27 representatives to the European Council are generally the heads of state of member governments with populationweighted voting in the chamber. Required approval rates (from simple majority to unanimity) vary across the bodies, by type of legislation and by state of treaty implementation (certain changes are scheduled through 2017). 2 Imagine if each material piece of US federal legislation, in addition to congressional approval, required unanimous approval of the fifty states, with each state having its own protocols and processes for approval (and its own, ever-evolving political agendas).
Institutional haves and havenots
Eurozone has grown for public holders (i.e., ECB, IMF, pension funds) to also participate in write-downs to enable a further trimming of Greece's debt load in the face of continued negative growth.
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The ECB had gone to great lengths to characterize the negotiated write-downs as voluntary. A non-voluntary write-down (i.e., default) would be expected to (a) trigger 4 Basel II also played a meaningful supporting role in eurozone private-bank uptake of sovereign debt by assigning zero risk-weighting to eurozone sovereign debt and fully counting it as Tier 1 capital (providing considerable incentive relative to other assets). 5 The failure of the ECB and other public holders of Greek sovereign debt to participate equally with private holders in a bond exchange with the Greek government risks precipitating (at least) an implied subordination of private holders across other eurozone sovereign issues (with potentially important market consequences).
significant (and potentially destabilizing) payouts on credit default swaps, (b) preclude additional ECB purchases of Greek sovereign debt or accepting it as collateral, (c) cause realization of significant write-downs on ECB, IMF, and other non-private holdings of Greek debt, and (d) potentially serve as a precedent for the handling of other troubled sovereigns.
It remains to be seen (a) whether the inserted CACs will be invoked by the Greek government to force private holders to accept the "haircut" (this will be a function of privateholder participation rates), (b) whether the 3.2 billion euros of credit default swaps will be triggered and (c) how the ECB will treat collateral in the form of Greek sovereign debt already pledged to it (as well as the banks which pledged the bonds). Between the two operations nearly 500 billion euros of new lending was extended by the ECB (almost 300 billion euros and about 230 billion euros of the first and second rounds, respectively, was related to the rolling of existing ECB loans).
For the troubled periphery, the market impact of the LTRO program has been to reduce yields by roughly half on treasuries having maturities three years and in, in both secondary markets and new-issue auctions. Yields beyond 3s, where banks can't match maturities against the ECB three-year term, generally have remained stubbornly high, at levels rendering debtservicing loads for the euro-tethered peripherals unsustainable.
The LTRO has provided desperately-needed liquidity to a private banking sector facing roughly 700 billion euros in debt maturities in 2012. On the sovereign side, Italy, Spain, and
Greece collectively face nearly 600 billion euros of maturities in 2012.
Through liquidity to banks (by accepting otherwise unmarketable debt as collateral), and through liquidity to sovereigns (supporting bond prices via backdoor monetization of new sovereign issues maturing three years and in, with private banks serving as yield-arbitrage intermediaries), ECB intervention appears to have at least slowed the downward spiral within the eurozone. Yet conditions on the ground are evolving rapidly. And risks are emerging and morphing as the continent's economic, social, and political fabric wears thin under relentless heaving and pitching. 
FROM BILLIONS TO TRILLIONS: AN EXPLOSION OF SCALE

ECB POLICY ORIENTATION: NO LONGER A "RIDDLE WRAPPED IN A MYSTERY INSIDE AN ENIGMA" 9
Since the first signs of fire on the Greek financial frontier in 2010, eurozone officials have enlisted tortured semantics and disjointed logic in public discourse relating to delicate common currency matters. Certainly much of such dialogue can be attributed to political infighting, shellshock, crisis fatigue, and confusion. But in calculated and directed discourse, this practice serves two practical purposes: first, the active stretching and contorting of language serves as a means to likewise stretch and contort interpretation of EU treaties and law, thereby facilitating the engagement of a broader range of initiatives by EU institutions; secondly, as does the Fed, ECB and eurozone officials expend a great deal of energy and attention in attempting to shape market perception and market (i.e., asset-pricing) response.
December 2011 made clear that, concerning liquidity to systemically important banks and banking blocks (and through them, systemically-important sovereigns), the ECB intends to maintain baseline hydration with a level of assertiveness comparable to that which the Fed has demonstrated since late 2008. Prior to December 2011, markets were uncertain on this point. Now they are all but certain on the matter: the liquidity spigot is fully operational, with both the means and will to turn the knob.
But the period since November 2011 has also foreshadowed limits to which the ECB and the supporting global cast will go to maintain the likes of Greece-i.e., those having a relatively (internally) small banking industry and modest GDP footprint and virtually no hope of recovery without a major erasure of debt. Far more concerning to the ECB are related banking linkages and risks ex-Greece. With Greece now having crossed the default threshold, only the manner of default and knock-on effects remain to be seen.
ADOPTING THE PREVAILING POSTURE AND STEP
The world's four largest sources of debt monetization machinery (the central banks of the US, UK, Japan, and now EU) are now fully operational and fully engaged. Other significant players are similarly disposed. This wasn't the case six months ago. The objective held in common is the preservation of global and regional banking systems (i.e., not securing the fate of any particular troubled sovereign or, GDP-wise, less-than-"significant" group of sovereigns).
With the LTROs, much of the European banking sector, unable to access capital markets otherwise, is in effect becoming a ward (or rather a utility-like functionary) of the ECB.
Liquidity is provided by the ECB via 1 percent money, and operating margins, likewise, are provided by the ECB through generous collateral terms enabling banks to arbitrage the lending rate against ownership or purchases of higher-yielding debt.
Without the LTRO and MRO (one-week "Main Refinancing Operations") programs, much of the banking sector has weakening sources of operating margins and virtually no access to liquidity. Without the LTRO, troubled euro-tethered sovereigns have zero prospect of selling debt at sustainable yields. The LTRO more fully equips the ECB to pursue its broader policy objectives but also to respond, for better or worse, to market dynamics and public sensitivities of the moment (i.e., like the Fed and the market's so-called "Bernanke Put" 10 ).
A SHARED (IF NOT FULLY-COORDINATED) RESPONSE
Given the reactionary nature and current posture of central banks, and the degree of global banking interdependencies, central bank responses to crises in the near term may be highly contemporaneous and directionally-similar, whether or not they are formally coordinated.
Importantly, though, monetary policy measures are capable of eliciting rather broad, seemingly-indiscriminate and unintended liquidity leakages and responses across assets globally, irrespective of whether they achieve desired price, employment, or other objectives.
Extremes in market volatility and negative performance in capital markets tend to result in heightened attention to monetary policy-and this has certainly been the case since mid-2007. Globally, material downside risk for a range of assets may persist so long as major segments of the banking industry have life-threatening exposure to potentially insolvent sovereigns. It appears, though, that considerable liquidity will likely be brought to bear whenever the edge of a cliff is perceived to draw frightfully near. Major monetary policy makers now have all run through one or more "test" applications of their respective primary policy tools. And most will likely prefer prompt and aggressive application of a liquidity balm to the prospect of gazing (yet again) into the abyss.
But given the scale of current emerging macro dislocations, there is also potential for macro policy of scale to fuel sharp asset rallies and bubbles. Given the precarious positions of numerous sovereigns and significant banking segments, and the highly-reactionary tendencies among major central banks, recurrent and sequential bouts of violent downturns followed by significant liquidity-inspired asset rallies is a distinct possibility in the likely unstable environment of the next 18-36 months. Importantly, in such an environment policy path consistency may prove to be judgmentally, administratively, and politically highly challenging.
With the ECB now fully engaged, and despite a still-plausible and meaningfully "disruptive" Greek default path, near-term concerns regarding risk of imminent calamity propagated from the eurozone may begin to transition to several, no-less-important questions.
the global struggle to secure demand, including risks of sharp inflationary pressures on the heels of deflationary struggles associated with the world's largest-ever debt binge and monetary expansion.
In the coming quarters there is likely to be no shortage of political and economic intrigue, market volatility and risk, and price and employment uncertainty. Global monetary policy players have their mitts off and sleeves rolled up on every front, and conditions across sovereigns and banks globally are as strained as they ever have been in the past seventy years.
